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The Living Wage: Reducing inequality in the UK? 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
The revival of support for a living wage has reopened a long-run debate over the extent to 
which active regulation of labour markets may be necessary to attain desired outcomes. 
Market failure is suggested to result in lower wages and remuneration for low skilled 
workers than might otherwise be expected from models of perfect competition. 
 
This paper examines the theoretical underpinning of living wage campaigns and 
demonstrates that once we move away from idealised models of perfect competition to 
one where employers retain power over the bargaining process, such as monopsony, it is 
readily understandable that low wages may be endemic in low skilled employment 
contracts. The paper then examines evidence, derived from the UK Quarterly Labour 
Force Survey, for the extent to which a living wage will address low pay within the 
labour force. We highlight the greater incidence of low pay within the private sector and 
then focus upon the public sector where the Living Wage demand has had most impact. 
We examine the extent to which addressing low pay within the public sector increases 
costs. We further highlight the evidence that a predominance of low pay exists among 
public sector young and women workers (and in particular lone parent women workers) 
but not, perhaps surprisingly, among workers from ethnic minority backgrounds. The 
paper then builds upon the results from the Quarterly Labour Force Survey with analysis 
of the British Household Panel Survey in order to examine the impact the introduction of 
a living wage, within the public sector, would have in reducing household inequality. 
 
The paper concludes that a living wage is indeed an appropriate regulatory response to 
market failure for low skilled workers and can act to reduce age and gender pay 
inequality, and reduce household income inequality among in-work households below 
average earnings. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The necessity and desirability of regulating labour markets, and specifically wage levels 
for low paid workers, has been debated as long as free wage labour has been a 
mechanism for the use of labour in the production process. Rioting and arson provided a 
means of resistance to both enforced and low paid unskilled labour in early industrial 
England. So in 1794 three days of rioting and arson destroyed the ‘crimping houses’ of 
central London used to recruit personnel into the military with its ‘... humiliating and 
degrading slavery, for the miserable pittance of sixpence a day...’1 As skilled labour faced 
competition from less skilled labour control over entry into guilds provided a mechanism 
for the protection of employment and wages in manufactured trades in the eighteenth and 
nineteenth century. Within the engineering trades of Birmingham restrictions upon the 
employment of ‘illegal men’ was retained until the 1890s.2 
 
Within this context the reigniting of campaigns for a living wage are but the most recent 
development of long running debates over the extent to which low skilled labour requires 
additional protection within the labour market. While the terminology and focus of such 
debates have altered over time to restrict child labour in the nineteenth century, utilise 
wages boards in sweated industrial and agricultural trades in the early twentieth century 
to minimum wages in the late twentieth century a living wage is but the most recent 
example of attempts to place a floor on the level of wages paid to unskilled labour. 
 
Central to the justification of a living wage lies the assumption that low skilled labour 
faces specific problems of excessive exploitation within market economies, particularly 
in relation to bargaining in employment contracts. Within an economic context this may 
arise from three specific reasons, namely in either the supply or demand for labour and 
finally in imperfect information within labour markets. 
 
If a living wage can be economically justified in terms of one or other forms of market 
failure what effect would such a wage have? Could a living wage demonstrate an ability 
to compensate for labour market heterogeneity? Could a living wage reduce the social 
cost of monopsony, perhaps by demonstrating an impact on equality? 3 
 
The following sections of this paper address these questions using data from the UK 
Quarterly Labour Force Survey and then, utilising data from the British Household Panel 
                                                 
1 Anon, Letters on the Impolicy of a Standing Army in Time of Peace, and on the 
unconstitutional and illegal measure of Barracks, quoted in Thompson E.P.(1982), The 
Making of the English Working Class, (Penguin, Harmonsdaworth)  p.88. 
2 Baines, D.E., (1988), ‘The labour supply and the labour market 1860-1914’, in R. Floud 
and D. McCloskey, The Economic History of Britain since 1700, vol.2, 1860 to the 
1970s, (Cambridge, University Press), P.162. 
3 Monopsony is where a firm acts as the only buyer of the factor of production in a 
market where there are many sellers. Hence we can think of the firm as an active agent in 
the market capable of utilising market power and turning private firm level costs into 
public social costs. 
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Survey, examines the impact of a living wage on income distribution within the UK. 
Section 2 examines the contemporary literature on the living wage and highlights its 
recent successes, while section 3 examines an economic explanation of monopsony for 
market failure underpinning the justification of a living wage. Section 4 introduces the 
data used to examine the potential impact of a living wage while section 5 provides 
evidence that, as advocates of the living wage suggest, while the cost of introducing a 
living wage in the public sector is small the impact on young and women workers and on 
household income inequality is significant. In conclusion the paper returns to the role of 
the use of regulation of labour markets as a mechanism of public policy. 
 
2. The Living Wage Campaign 
 
The current interest in the living wage originates in the spread of a movement from the 
United States to the United Kingdom in the 1990s. The transmission of the concept 
derived from support provided by the community organisation The East London 
Communities Organisation (TELCO) and the public sector UNISON.4 Research on low 
pay amongst workers in the East End of London demonstrated the incidence of low pay 
among cleaning workers across the city and the role that contracting-out of services had 
played in encouraging levels of pay to fall close to the minimum wage level of £3.70 per 
hour in 2001.5 Those working in low paid sectors were likely to be excluded from wider 
labour markets due to these other firms’ recruitment policies which focused upon higher 
skilled labour. In the case of private sector cleaning companies such as those contracted 
to Canary Wharf in London firms concentrated their recruitment focus upon recent 
migrants, and as white workers and older immigrant groups, such as those from the 
Caribbean, moved out of cleaning more recent immigrant groups replaced them. These 
workers often found their language skills restricted their access to better paid 
employment. The development of Compulsory Competitive Tendering (CCT) within 
public bodies, to ensure low cost provision of goods and services, was identified as one 
of the key drivers in these developments whereby reduced costs were achieved through 
cuts in staffing, pay levels and quality of provision.6 
 
A further group found to be working in the low pay sector, particularly in the case of 
those who remained within the public sector, were female workers in households with 
children. These workers were dependent upon work which fitted with existing low cost 
childcare arrangements. These groups were also often found to be at risk of their pay and 
conditions of service being reduced over time in the face of threats of contracting-out of 
service provision to private providers under CCT rules.7 Thus in-house provision 
                                                 
4 For a chronology of the British development of the living wage campaign see 
http://www.geog.qmul.ac.uk/livingwage/chronology.html.  
5 Wills, J., 2001, ‘Mapping Low Pay in East London’, (London, UNISON), p.3. 
6 Wills, J., 2001, ‘Mapping Low Pay in East London’, (London, UNISON), p.8. 
7 See Wills, ‘Mapping’, pp.7-10 and Wills, J. (2007), ‘A global workforce in a global 
city: The skills, experiences and aspirations of a group of contract cleaners in London, 
UK’, Queen Mary University, Dept Geography, Working paper. p.4. 
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remained but only if higher pay, conditions and staffing levels fell to imitate those lower 
levels of pay, conditions and staffing exhibited in the private sector. 
 
The development and spread of low pay within a highly segmented labour market is 
suggested to have been a direct consequence of the rise of a new unequal geography of 
globalisation.8 Globalisation has permitted rising profitability within business occurring 
at the expense of the share of wealth going into wages and salaries.9 While living 
standards were maintained it was only done so at the cost of rapidly rising levels of 
personal debt which itself triggered the current global economic crisis.10 As a result, 
Wilkinson and Pickett suggest, contemporary advanced societies have seen rapidly rising 
levels of inequality across a range of social indicators including income, health and 
wellbeing, crime, violence and social dislocation.11 Further, the ability to resist these 
processes has been reduced by falling trade union membership and weakening of trade 
union influence in pay bargaining with the result that the least skilled, least educated and 
most vulnerable workers are the most likely to face low wages and poor working 
conditions.12 
 
Globalisation has, in conclusion within this literature, ensured that high levels of low 
wage labour has emerged and this labour has been found to have limited access to higher 
waged, higher skilled labour markets. Thus, the living wage discourse identifies both low 
bargaining power and a resultant inequality within earned income as central to 
explanations for the need for regulation of low skill labour markets. A living wage may 
also, we might suggest, have a progressive impact on those sections of the labour force 
trapped into low waged, low skilled work, in particular those facing discrimination in 
terms of age, gender or race. 
 
The success of the Living Wage campaign in London is suggested to have won pay 
increases for some 6,000 workers in London across the private and public sectors 
                                                 
8 Harvey, D. (2006), Spaces of Global Capitalism, (London, Verso), Stiglitz, J. E. (2002), 
Globalisation and its Discontents, (London Penguin) and Harman C. (2009), Zombie 
Capitalism: Global Crisis and the relevance of Marx, (London, Bookmarks) for differing 
perspectives on the extent and development of globalisation. 
9 This point is made from two very different perspectives by Brenner, R. (2006), The 
Economics of Global Turbulence, (London, verso) and Daly, K and Broadbent, B (2009), 
‘The Savings Glut: the Return on Capital and the Rise of Risk Aversion’ Global 
Economic Paper, No. 185, Goldman Sachs Global Economics, Commodities and 
Strategy Research.  
10 See Turner, G. (2008), The Credit Crunch: Housing Bubbles, Globalization and the 
Worldwide Economic Crisis, (London, Pluto Books). 
11 Wilkinson R. and Pickett K. (2009), The Spirit Level: Why More Equal Societies 
Almost Always Do Better, (London, Allen Lane). 
12 Mason P. (2007), Live Working or Die Fighting: How the Working Class Went Global, 
(London, Harvill Secker) and Patel R. (2007), Stuffed and Starved: Markets, power and 
the Hidden Battle for the World Food System, (London, Portobello). 
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ensuring increased income to poor households totalling over £30 million by 2009.13 As a 
result calls for a living wage have become central to union wage bargaining and 
campaigns across the UK. Locally calculated living wages have begun to be developed to 
reflect the variation of living costs across the UK. A recent example of this is Glasgow 
City Council who in 2009 was the largest of 130 employers across the city to support the 
introduction of a £7 per hour living wage.14 
 
A wider role for the public sector, as a mechanism for encouraging the development of a 
living wage, has also been recognised. The public sector as a major employer, indeed the 
largest employment sector in many areas, potentially provides a significant driver for 
introducing a living wage within the private sector. As a significant purchaser of goods 
and services, many of which fall into the employment categories typical of the minimum 
wage sectors, the public sector may impose minimum conditions of employment upon all 
private contractors awarded contracts. While this is an important potential externality for 
a public sector living wage it is difficult to accurately assess. Thus, it is the narrower 
impact of a living wage on the public sector that is the focus for the study in this paper. 
Before doing so, however, we first turn to providing an economic understanding of a 
living wage. 
 
3. Economic Theory and the Living Wage 
 
Models of perfect competition within economics suggest that in equilibrium labour gains 
its marginal product value in relation to the production process. Where this equilibrium 
fails to emerge in the short-run market signals provide an automatic mechanism for 
moving towards equilibrium through the price mechanism. It is efficient for firms to 
increase the quantity of labour employed where the marginal product of a marginal 
increase of labour is greater than the price paid for that unit of labour. Where the 
marginal product of labour is below the price paid for the last unit of labour employed it 
is efficient for the firm to reduce the quantity of labour employed and reduce output. 
Hence in models of perfect competition labour automatically gains its true value based 
upon the need for firms themselves to achieve a profit maximising level of efficiency at a 
point where marginal cost equals marginal revenue.15 
 
Under perfect competition the wage paid for labour is also suggested to reflect the value 
added in the production process and low skilled labour therefore receives a low wage due 
to its limited contribution to the value added in the production process. Stable, draws on 
                                                 
13 Press  release; Queen Mary College, University of London, ‘Clean living: new report 
shows economic and ethical benefits to paying cleaning staff ‘living wage’ at Queen 
Mary’, Friday, 18 December 2009. 
14 See www.glasgowlivingwage.co.uk/Glasgow_living_wage_employers/ accessed 16th 
December 2009. 
15 Any first year introductory textbook provides an explanation for this approach. For 
example see Begg D., Fischer S., and Dornbusch, (2000), Economics, (sixth edition, 
McGraw Hill, London), pp.117-23. 
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this analysis for his rejection of a living wage and suggests a living wage would distort 
market signals and hence introduce inefficiencies within market economies.16 
 
The major difficulty with this approach is the assumption of perfect competition. While 
perfect competition is introduced to first year economic undergraduates as a mechanism 
for resource allocation it is not an assumption that is retained as the teaching of 
economics is developed. Models of imperfect competition, with firms represented as 
price-making rather than price-taking agents, all provide a much richer and subtler 
approach to understanding the behaviour of firms and real world markets. Under these 
environments firms are capable of exercising market power and in the case of monopoly, 
where one seller exists, or monopsony, where one buyer exists, we can demonstrate that 
despite firms retaining a profit maximising utility function the outcome is not efficient for 
the economy as a whole. 
 
It is of course not that Stable fails to recognise non-market behaviour. Indeed Coase is 
utilised to demonstrate how firms act to minimise and abolish externalities arising from 
imperfect competition.17 However the difficulty with this is that Coase, in suggesting that 
firms exist as a means of generating transaction cost savings through hierarchical co-
ordination as opposed to market co-ordination, provides evidence that perfect 
competition is indeed an unhelpful starting point. If firms emerge and employ labour 
directly rather than use markets for co-ordination it is because there are transaction cost 
savings to be achieved through direct employment.18 These savings, within a Williamson 
type transaction cost framework, derive from lowering search, contracting and 
enforcement costs for labour.19 Thus labour contracts provide a mechanism for the firm to 
counter-act, i.e. ignore, market signals and increase efficiency through the transaction 
cost savings of hierarchies. But these savings are not automatically shared with labour 
and can be captured by the firm itself. So as Pitelis demonstrates the very existence of 
firms themselves indeed demonstrate the development of bargaining power of firms over 
labour, hierarchy over market co-ordination.20 
 
Heterogeneity within human capital formation may give rise to specific problems with 
the supply of low skilled labour. A section of the labour force may have low skill due to 
endogenous factors, for example poor formal qualifications or low levels of uncodified 
knowledge acquired through learning-by-doing, or exogenous factors, for example work 
processes organised in such ways that low levels of workplace training are provided. 
Heterogeneity within human capital formation may thus generate a section of the labour 
                                                 
16 Stable, D.R., (2008), The Living Wage: Lessons from the History of Economic 
Thought, (Edward Elgar, Cheltenham). 
17 Stable, D.R., (2008), The Living Wage: Lessons from the History of Economic 
Thought, (Edward Elgar, Cheltenham), pp.124-31. 
18 Coase, R.H., (1937), ‘The nature of the firm’, Economica, (N.S.) 4, pp.386-405. 
19 Williamson, O. E (1985), The economic institutions of capitalism : firms, markets, 
relational contracting, New York, Free Press.  
20 Pitelis, C. N., (1993), Market and non-market hierarchies : theory of institutional 
failure, Oxford : Blackwell. 
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force unable to access higher skilled, high wage employment as an alternative to low 
skilled, low paid employment. Alternatively, we might assume heterogeneity within the 
demand for labour and an over-supply of unskilled labour might depress wages in the 
unskilled sector. Employers under these circumstances may choose a low capital 
production function and maximise profitability by employing lower cost workers than 
might otherwise be the case. Such an over-supply of unskilled labour may be identified as 
arising from either a real growth of the labour supply, for example through migration 
between countries, discrimination over access to higher paid work facing a section of the 
population, or alternatively from an employer’s threatened use of globalised production  
processes and the movement of production abroad. Finally, we might identify imperfectly 
competitive market structures whereby employers possess, and utilise, bargaining power 
over employees. Where firms are considered to be price-makers rather than price-takers a 
deadweight social loss emerges that ensures profit maximisation still occurs for the 
employer but additional social costs are incurred by society. Within this framework, as 
we go on to show, this social cost may be borne by unskilled workers through low wages. 
 
Economists who have moved away from models of perfect competition have generated 
very different conclusions to conceptualising the role of labour in economies.21 
Blanchflower and Oswald’s  work on the relationship between local unemployment and 
wage rates suggest that a wages curve implies a negative correlation and causation 
between unemployment levels and wage rates. Rather than employers having to 
compensate workers with a disutility premium for living in areas of high unemployment 
higher levels of local unemployment are associated with lower wage levels. They argue 
that an estimated unemployment elasticity of pay of -0.1 holds and that this finding is at 
odds with orthodox teaching of labour market behaviour but is consistent with bargaining 
and efficiency wage models.22 They suggest their findings are borne out by empirical data 
across time and across countries. Indeed Blanchflower and Oswald argue that their 
conclusions are so strong that ‘much of conventional thinking is wrong’.23 Furthermore, 
in his analysis of the operation of the U.S. minimum wage, Flinn also used a model 
incorporating imperfect competition to generate results that would suggest that in order to 
maximise welfare the minimum wage should rise dramatically to $8.66 per hour 
compared to the minimum wage level of $4.25 that existed at the time.24 His argument 
was that an increase in the minimum wage would significantly increase participation rates 
on the supply side (by decreasing the rate of ‘Out of the Labour Force’) with the result 
that while unemployment rates would rise total welfare could be demonstrated to rise by 
24.2 per cent.25 
                                                 
21 Sawyer, M.C. (1979), Theories of  the Firm, (London, Weidenfield & Nicholson), 
provides an introduction to much of this work.  
22 Blachflower D.G. and Oswald, A.J., (1996), The Wages Curve, (Massac, USA, MIT), 
p.361 
23 Blachflower D.G. and Oswald, A.J., (1996), The Wages Curve, p.13 
24 Flinn, C.J., (2006), ‘Minimum Wage Effects on Labor Market Outcomes under Search, 
Matching, and Endogenous Contact Rates’ Econometrica, Vol. 74, No. 4 (Jul., 2006), pp. 
1013-1062  
25 Ibid., p.1058 
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Most famously we can suggest that the work by Akerlof, leading to the awarding of the 
Nobel prize in economics, on uncertainty is also of relevance.26 Akerlof’s key argument 
was that in a market whereby the seller of a good (poor quality second hand cars - 
″lemons″) knows the quality of the product but the purchaser cannot judge the quality of 
the good, prices are driven down as all goods in the market are considered to be inferior 
(all second-hand cars are considered to be ″lemons″). Under these circumstances only 
poorer quality goods can be found in the market as good quality providers cannot use 
price as a signal of quality. 
 
While Akerlof uses the car market to highlight the role played by uncertainty he goes on 
to suggest that in other markets where information asymmetry exists, such as in relation 
to recruitment, similar markets for ″lemons″ emerge. As Akerlof suggests in relation to 
disadvantaged groups facing discrimination in employment “an employer may make a 
rational decision not to hire any members of these groups in responsible positions – 
because it is difficult to distinguish those with good job qualifications from those with 
bad qualifications”27 
 
In the case of markets whereby firms provide low skill services, such as cleaning, those 
firms capable of providing lower quality (through lower pay, conditions and staffing) 
drive out higher quality, existing in-house, providers generating a market for ″lemons″. 
 
This literature suggests that once we move away from conceptualising markets as 
perfectly competitive it is a common result for firms to be able to gain and exercise 
market power. Regulation of the labour market through minimum wages may then be 
understood as a mechanism to reduce firm’s abuse of their market power. 
 
For the purposes of this paper we suggest that where firms act as monopsonists within a 
labour market we can readily demonstrate a standard result that wages will be lower than 
under perfect competition. Under monopsony where a firm decides to increase its 
quantity of labour it no longer faces a constant price for labour and instead faces an 
upward sloping labour supply curve. Figure 1 compares the labour supply curve for a 
firm under perfect competition S(p) with the labour supply curve under monopsony 
S(m).28 Where a firm under perfect competition introduces a marginal increase in labour 
from L to L*, their marginal costs remain constant (wage W). In contrast where the same 
marginal increase in the quantity of labour is introduced for a monopsonist, due to the 
upward sloping supply curve the cost of labour has increased from W to W*. The shaded 
area represents this cost increase to W*. This new level of wages may be considered as 
the total rise in cost of a marginal increase in labour. The result is that the monopsonist 
                                                 
26 Akerlof, G. A. (1970), ‘The Market for ″Lemons″: Quality Uncertainty and the Market 
Mechanism’, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 84, 3, pp.488-500 
27 Akerlof, G. A. (1970), ‘The Market for ″Lemons″, p.495. 
28 See Frank, R.H, (1994), Microeconomics and Behaviour, 2nd edition New York, 
McGraw Hill, p.572-77 for a fuller discussion. 
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firm faces rapidly rising marginal labour costs and therefore sets production at a level 
lower than would be expected under perfect competition. 
 
INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE 
 
If monopsony permits us to explain the market failure which gives rise to the proposal for 
a living wage what impact would such a policy have? It is to this question we now turn 
but prior to doing so we highlight our methodology and use of the UK Quarterly Labour 
Force Survey and British Household Panel Survey data in addressing these issues. 
 
4. Methodology & Data 
 
Our study seeks to examine the distribution of low wages within the UK labour market. 
The UK Quarterly Labour Force Survey (QLFS) is the largest and most authoritative data 
set available for this form of research. The QLFS is a quarterly survey of those within the 
labour force, employed and unemployed, with detailed data on wages rates and individual 
characteristics. Our study of the QLFS is obtained by aggregating together 16 waves of 
quarterly data, starting with the January 2005 to March 2005 quarter, and finishing with 
the October 2008 to December 2008 quarter. Once we have excluded those respondents 
who are not in paid employment, and those missing data that we require for our analysis, 
our sample consists of 102,121 employed respondents, of whom 73,167 are in the private 
sector (71.6% of all employees) and 28,954 in the public sector (28.4%). 
 
The QLFS data permits us to disaggregate the population by wage levels and in this study 
we disaggregate the population into bands of wage levels increasing at each level by 25 
pence. We further disaggregate the population into private and public sector to examine 
the differences within the two sectors. 
 
Once we have disaggregated the population into wage bands it is possible to notionally 
increase public sector wage rates such that all public sector employees currently paid at a 
rate less than the living wage are instead paid at a level equal to a living wage in order to 
examine the costs of a living wage on the public sector. Where the living wage has 
already been implemented its level has been determined by reference to a relative poverty 
measure, and in practice its level has been £7.00 per hour or thereabouts.. In our analysis 
we examine the effects of a living wage set at a variety of levels, though the focus of our 
discussion is on the effects of a living wage set at the rate identified by the Joseph 
Rowntree Foundation (JRT) and set by Glasgow City Council in 2009, namely £7.00 per 
hour. It is important, however, to acknowledge two qualifications regarding this 
approach. First, the analysis does not take account of any increase in wage bill asked, or 
required, of private sector employers who provide goods or services to the public sector. 
Second, the analysis does not take account of any wage rises that employees above the 
living wage may seek in order to maintain wage differentials over those employees 
benefitting from the introduction of the living wage. Thus our analysis is a comparative 
static assessment and does not consider dynamic effects. 
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Our final analysis of the QLFS involves the further disaggregation of the data to examine 
specific effects of a public sector living wage on young workers, women workers, female 
single parent households and ethnic minority. 
 
Our final analysis involves investigating the extent to which a living wage may act as an 
effective policy lever in addressing inequality. In order to examine this we need to use a 
different data set to the QLFS. Although much smaller in size, with only 10,000 
households, the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) crucially permits us to link 
wage earners together in order to examine changes of wage rates on household incomes 
and household inequality. The BHPS thus provides us with the ability to utilise household 
composition data to examine the impact on inequality within the income distribution at 
the household level. Hence we can examine changes in the level of household inequality, 
a key indicator of the reduction of market failure identified by proponents of the living 
wage.  In this section of the analysis we use equivalised household income (i.e. 
household income data adjusted by a McClements Scale score for household composition 
in order to obtain income measures that more accurately reflect household poverty levels) 
to examine the extent to which the increase derived from a living wage goes to 
households lower down the income distribution at each decile level. Here again we are 
using a comparative static approach and do not consider dynamic effects. Most 
importantly we do not estimate the impact of the reduction of means tested welfare 
income caused by increases in earned income. 
 
5. Results 
 
Low Pay & the costs of a Living Wage 
 
Figure 2 below presents the distribution of hourly wage rates in the QLFS data for all 
employees, plus separately for private and public sector employees.29 What is very 
marked about these results is the modal wage for both all employees and private sector 
employees at the statutory minimum wage for non-youth employees (as of October 2008 
this stood at £5.73 per hour, falling within the £5.50 - £5.74 per hour band) – this single 
hourly wage band accounts for 3.03% of all employees and 3.77% of private sector 
employees. For public sector employees, the distribution peaks at £7.50 - £7.74 per hour, 
with 2.38% of public sector employees in that hourly wage band. These results suggest 
that for much of the private sector the statutory minimum wage constitutes a binding 
constraint on just how low hourly wage rates can be set.30 An immediate conclusion 
flowing from this is that a living wage could potentially constitute a binding constraint on 
low hourly wage rates in the public sector. 
 
                                                 
29 The graphs are truncated at the upper end at an hourly wage rate of £25 per hour, 
which encompasses 93.4% of employees, 93.3% of private sector employees and 93.6% 
of public sector employees. 
30 As highlighted above, private sector employees account for 71.6% of the total 
employee sample, so the minimum wage peak in their wage distribution is primarily 
responsible for the all employee minimum wage peak. 
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INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE 
 
The principal reason that tends to be used for a public body not paying a living wage over 
and above the statutory minimum wage is the financial cost of such a policy (and the 
consequences for taxation and / or public services). Figure 3 below shows the cost to the 
public sector of applying differing levels of the living wage (expressed as a percentage of 
the current public sector wage bill).31 It is clear that the cost to the public finances 
increases as the proposed living wage increases; ceteris paribus, a higher living wage 
results in a higher number of employees benefitting from the living wage and a higher 
average benefit per employee (with the total benefit to employees (and hence the total 
financial cost to the public sector) being the product of these two numbers). In theory this 
suggests the possibility that the financial cost of the living wage would rise exponentially 
as its rate increases. However, proponents of the living wage, and its early adopters, have 
more modest targets in mind.32 Our analysis indicates that if the living wage 
recommended by the Joseph Rowntree Foundation and set by Glasgow City Council of 
£7.00 per hour were applied nationally it would increase the UK’s public sector wage bill 
by 1.21%. Even factoring in the additional national insurance and pension contributions 
this rises to just 1.51%.33 The evidence thus does not support the argument that a living 
wage would impose an unreasonable financial burden on public bodies. Whilst these 
numbers are not miniscule, in the context of the government’s strained finances at the 
time of writing (early 2010) neither are they of the kind of magnitude that the opponents 
of the living wage would imply in their arguments. 
 
INSERT FIGURE 3 HERE 
 
Although the living wage we have focused on resulted from research undertaken by the 
Joseph Rowntree Foundation is just one possible figure, Figure 4 below presents the 
marginal cost of moving the living wage from one wage rate band to the next (in effect a 
25 pence increase in the minimum wage); again, these costs are denominated as a 
percentage of the public sector wage bill. 
 
                                                 
31 The analysis limits itself to the financial cost to the public sector of increases in the 
wages it pays its employees; it does not take account of additional wage-related costs to 
the public sector such as employer national insurance contributions or employer pension 
contributions. Additional National Insurance contributions and employer pension 
contributions would amount to approximately a further 25% increase in the cost brought 
about by the introduction of the living wage. 
32 The figure of £7 per hour is derived from research undertaken by the Joseph Rowntree 
Foundation. Information about the Glasgow City Council scheme, and the successes it 
has achieved, are available at 
http://www.glasgowlivingwage.co.uk/What_is_a_Living+_Wage/. 
33 It is also important to note that employee wages are not the entirety of the public 
sector’s costs – given that many public sector bodies spend around 60% to 65% of their 
budget on employee wages, the cost of the living wage could alternatively be presented 
as about 1% of the total public sector budget. 
 13
INSERT FIGURE 4 HERE 
 
Our analysis shows that the additional cost of increasing the living wage from £7 per 
hour to £7.25 per hour would be only 0.26% of the current public sector wage bill, while 
the saving achieved by instituting a living wage of only £6.75 per hour would lessen the 
cost by only 0.22% of the current public sector wage bill. The relatively low cost of a 
higher living wage combined with, as we demonstrate later in the paper, the inequality 
reducing effects of a living wage means that the £7 per hour recommended by the JRT 
and implemented by Glasgow City Council could perhaps be increased still further. 
 
While the above highlights the extent of low pay and the relatively low costs of 
regulating low pay it is also necessary to consider who benefits from a living wage in the 
public sector. 
 
Youth, Gender & Ethnicity 
 
As Figure 2 above highlighted the hourly wage distributions do not begin at £5.73 per 
hour (the £5.50 - £5.74 per hour wage band) – 12.3% of all employees, and 15.0% and 
5.6% of private and public sector employees respectively, earn below the non-youth 
statutory minimum wage. Two principal reasons for this exist. First, workers under the 
age of 22 have a lower statutory minimum wage (as of October 2008 it was £4.77 per 
hour for employees in the age range 18-21, and £3.53 for employees in the age range 16-
17). Second, not all employers will be compliant with the minimum wage legislation.34 If 
young workers are particularly affected by low pay we should be able to identify the 
increased prevalence of young workers in the QLFS wage data. Figure 5 below provides 
exactly this insight into the extent to which those employees on the lowest hourly wage 
rates tend to be young employees – the data indicate, for each of the hourly wage bands, 
the ratio of the percentage of young employees in that band compared to the percentage 
of all employees in that band. Thus, for example, 3.75% of young private sector 
employees are in the £5.50 - £5.74 hourly wage band, compared to 3.77% of all private 
sector employees, resulting in a percentage of 99.43; the figures for the public sector are 
1.78%, 1.14% and 155.99% respectively. 
 
INSERT FIGURE 5 HERE 
 
                                                 
34 A third, data-related possibility exists. Our sample consists of data drawn from 16 
quarters of the QLFS; all wage data taken from quarters prior to the last (October 2008 to 
December 2008) have been inflated on the basis of the UK’s Retail Price Index (RPI) to 
make them comparable to October 2008. It is possible for those at the very bottom of the 
hourly wage distribution that changes in the statutory minimum wage may have resulted 
in hourly wage increases different to (possibly greater than) the change in the RPI, so our 
adjustment would slightly understate the hourly wage rate increases these low paid 
employees actually received. 
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The main result is quite dramatic, though not entirely a surprise – for both the private and 
the public sector there is a clear, positive relationship between age and hourly wage rates 
(young employees are much more likely to be placed in low hourly wage bands than their 
older counterparts). However, a more disturbing result can also be discerned. Whereas 
Figure 2 demonstrated that private sector hourly wages are much more skewed towards 
the minimum wage, this evidence demonstrates that young workers in the public sector 
are more likely to be found at the lower wage bands than older workers. Thus whatever 
protection against low wages is offered by the public sector, this protection tends to be 
reserved for its older employees. For most wage bands prior to the £7.00 - £7.24 band, 
younger public sector workers tend to be placed within each band with a frequency two 
to three times that of their older public sector counterparts. 
 
This result has strong implications for the appropriate applicability of the living wage 
across age groups. The UK’s minimum wage legislation offers differing levels of 
protection depending on the employee’s age, with a standard hourly rate for those aged 
22 and above and a lower rate for those between 18 and 21 and an even lower rate for 
those who are 16 or 17. The stated intention was to prevent the minimum wage pricing 
young (less experienced) people out of the labour market. These results suggest that 
contrary to what we might expect, it is public sector that is incorporating age into its 
wage structure more markedly than its private sector counterpart. Therefore, 
incorporating into the living wage regulations the age discrimination found in the 
minimum wage seems highly likely to generate widespread, unequal treatment of young 
workers by the public sector. The regulation of the labour market that a non-
discriminatory living wage would introduce would impact quite markedly on the public 
sector’s low wage structure. 
 
Low pay is not spread evenly throughout the demographic groups in British society, and 
the above analysis suggests that we need to examine whether the living wage would 
target its assistance at other disadvantaged demographic groups, for it is not just young 
workers who the living wage literature suggests are particularly disadvantaged by weak 
regulation in the labour market. Women generally and specifically women in single 
parent households and ethnic minority workers are all specifically identified as subject to 
problems within the labour market. To this end we examined the extent to which the 
living wage would in fact target its assistance at these particular groups – women (who 
make up 66% of our public sector sample) and ethnic minority workers (6.9% of our 
public sector sample). Figure 6 below suggests that the introduction of a living wage 
would target resources at women workers, though not at ethnic minority workers.35 
 
INSERT FIGURE 6 HERE 
 
For the wage bands running from £4.25 - £4.49 through to £18.75 - £18.99 the proportion 
of the additional wage bill accruing to women workers exceeds their representation in the 
                                                 
35 Note in all of the analyses that follow it is assumed that the living wage is applied to all 
employees, regardless of age. 
 
 15
public sector workforce, peaking at 71.69% for the £7.00 - £7.24 wage band (containing 
the wage rate recommended by the JRF and chosen by Glasgow City Council). The £7.00 
per hour living wage is in fact the optimal level in terms of redressing the gender wage 
gap. Furthermore, the financial assistance accruing to females as a result of a public 
sector living wage is particularly focused on those females in single parent households, as 
indicated by the other data graphed in Figure 6. This data indicates, separately for each 
wage band, the percentage of public sector female employees who are in single parent 
households. The general picture to be taken from these data is that female single parents 
working in the public sector tend to be disproportionately located in lower wage bands, 
and hence would disproportionately benefit from the introduction of a public sector living 
wage. 
 
Somewhat contrary to the living wage literature our results do not support the view that a 
public sector living wage could represent a mechanism whereby the living standards of 
ethnic minority workers would be targeted. From the wage band £6.25 - £6.49 onwards 
the proportion of the additional wage bill accruing to ethnic minority workers is less than 
their representation in the public sector workforce. One explanation for this result may be 
that ethnic minority workers fill many higher skilled roles, e.g. trained medical positions 
within the UK’s National Health Service, and whether they are doctors or nurses they are 
unlikely to benefit from a living wage anywhere near the £7 per hour that is the focus of 
much of the debate about the living wage in the UK. It might also be noted that the living 
wage literature identifies a particular subset of ethnic minority workers who might not be 
typically found within the public sector, recent immigrant workers with poor English 
language skills. 
 
If the QLFS data suggests that a living wage could indeed impact on young and women 
workers’ wage rates, reducing age and gender discrimination, it remains to be seen what 
impact a living wage could have on inequality more generally. It is to this question that 
we now turn. 
 
Inequality & the Living Wage 
 
The British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) provides data on household composition. 
Although the BHPS has a smaller sample size it permits us to go beyond the analysis 
available with the QLFS and not only identify public sector workers but also group those 
workers within their respective households and calculate their total household income. 
This can also be equivilised, using a McClements scale, to ensure comparability between 
large and small households. In doing so we are then able to rank households within an 
income distribution into deciles in order to examine the extent to which the benefits from 
a living wage accrue to those households lower down the income distribution. 
 
Figure 7 demonstrates that the benefits of a living wage accrue predominantly to 
households in the first and the fourth income deciles. Households in which the working 
poor are located will be at or below median income (the fourth decile) or alternatively 
unable to claim work-related benefits (first decile). Workless households in receipt of 
welfare benefits (typically the second and third income deciles) will see less of an impact 
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of a living wage and those at the highest end of the income distribution (deciles six and 
above) will also see very little benefit from a living wage. Thus, bar chart in Figure 7 
shows that 17.38% of all of the additional income goes to households in decile 1, while 
19.50% goes to households in decile 4. This concentrated effect is even more apparent 
when we express these additional incomes as a percentage of each deciles existing total 
income (line graph in Figure 7). Thus, using this approach we see that the living wage’s 
effect is most pronounced on the first decile (0.53%) and the fourth decile (0.22%)36. Not 
surprisingly the living wage needs to be understood as an in-work anti-poverty measure 
and is particularly effective at addressing inequality within the lowest income decile. 
 
INSERT FIGURE 7 HERE 
 
6. Conclusions 
 
This paper examined the literature on a living wage derived from both a human 
geography and economic perspective. It demonstrated that the arguments for regulating 
low wages within the labour market can be readily identified within a context of market 
failure. It further examined the evidence for the impact of a living wage on the public 
sector and found compelling evidence for the positive effect a living wage could have on 
three specific groups of workers; young, women and women workers heading single 
parent households. In addition the living wage had a progressive impact on income 
inequality for those households in work. Surprisingly, it found little impact on ethnic 
minority workers but this may be explicable in the limited access to the public sector for 
newly migrant low-skilled workers. 
 
The cost of the living wage was also found to be low relative to the public sector pay bill. 
At 1.21 percent of the total pay bill anti-poverty measures such as the living wage may be 
an effective in-work remedy to household inequality. The additional cost of the living 
wage would also be offset by rising tax income derived by increased participation rates 
induced by these incentives to enter employment. 37 
 
There are two areas where this study may be limited. First we do not address the impact a 
rise in the wage rate would have on households’ receipt of welfare benefits. Were these to 
be withdrawn at high marginal rates the impact of the living wage would be markedly 
reduced. Second we have focused our examination of the living wage solely on the public 
sector. If public sector organisations were to impose a living wage clause on all its private 
sub-contractors then both the benefit and the cost of the public sector living wage would 
be greater than indicated by these results. 
                                                 
36 These percentage figures might at first sight appear small. However, this is not entirely 
surprising given that, as we have already seen, the cost of the living wage is only 1.21% 
of the public sector wage bill, the public sector is only 28.6% of the workforce, and total 
household income includes not just labour income. 
37 Flinn, C.J., (2006), ‘Minimum Wage Effects on Labor Market Outcomes under Search, 
Matching, and Endogenous Contact Rates’ Econometrica, Vol. 74, No. 4 (Jul., 2006), pp. 
1013-1062. 
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Figure I 
Labour supply under perfect competition and monopsony 
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Figure 2 
Distribution of Hourly Wages
(Source: UK Quarterly Labour Force Survey)
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Figure 3
Cost of Living Wage (percentage of Existing Public Sector Wage Bill)
(Source: UK Quarterly Labour Force Survey)
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Figure 4
Marginal Cost of Living Wage (percentage of Existing Public Sector Wage Bill)
(Source: UK Quarterly Labour Force Survey)
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Figure 5
Young Employee Hourly Wage  as % a Percentage of all Employee Hourly Wage 
(Source: UK Quarterly Labour Force Survey)
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Figure 6
Percentage of Living Wage Benefits Going To Women (red) and Ethnic Minorities (green);
Percentage of Women who are Lone Parents (blue)
(Source: UK Quarterly Labour Force Survey)
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Figure 7
Distribution of the benefits (Equivilised Income) of a £7 per hour Public Sector Living Wage
(Source British Household Panel Survey)
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